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A PCJST-KAXTIAN ANTINOMY
BY ERNEST T. PAINE
LIKE most titles, the subject "A Post-Kantian Antinomy" is a
misnomer. If any philosophical problem was both Kantian and
pre-Kantian. the question between mechanism and teleology might be
so designated. But for some reason best known to himself Kant
did not explicitly include this well-dried bone of contention among
the dialectical fossils which adorn the pages of the "Critique of Pure
Reason" The universe had (and had not) a beginning in
time: everything (and nothing) is simple; there must (and there
cannot) be freedom: there is (and there is not) a necessary Being
on whom the world depends. Certainly these disputes involve the
question of purposiveness. But it remained for Charles Darwin
to supply conditions under which the dry bone should return to life
and reassume its antinomian form,—the same shape, but grown
massive and portentous. In our day there must come to every
thoughtful person at least some moments when chase, or even cap-
ture, by dinosaur, mammoth, or ichthyosaurus, would be welcome
in preference to the agony of slow torture by a cosmological monster
that is not only prehistoric but two-headed.
For the present discussion there is little need of assembling reas-
ons pro and contra in the formal Kantian manner so as to see how
neatly they annul each other. It is quite possible, of course, to
assume an affectation of skepticism and go about looking for anti-
nomies, like Lucian's philosopher with the scales. "And what are
the scales for, my fine fellow?" said the prospective buyer to this
promising slave. "Oh, I put argimients in them" was the reply:
"and when I get the arguments evenly balanced, so that they differ
by not so much as a feather's weight, then I don't know which side
is more convincing." \Mien it comes to teleology, however, skepti-
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cism would often seem to be no matter of mere affectation. There are
times when without any pretensions to the subtlety of sophist or
Jesuit we would as soon take one side as the other in the debate.
Purpose must, and purpose cannot be, the guiding principle of the
universe.
The contradiction is sufficiently disturbing
;
yet after all why
meddle with it ? How fatuous, indeed, to repeat the time-worn argu-
ments and illustrations ! But these are. many of them, just the
difficulties that have never been adequately dealt with. I wander
out in the fields in the autumn and come home covered with those
perverse, adhesive, two-tined seed-carriers commonly known as
stick-tights. Stick is what they will do, defying any implement
of removal. A fine-toothed comb will be as useless as a garden-
rake. It will take longer to pick them off than it will to write this
paper. Well, we sometimes feel like saying, only an idiot could fail
to see purposiveness in such adaptations. Good for William
Jennings Bryan ! Tie had the courage to utter what we all really
thought. Let us no longer be satisfied with glittering evolutionary
generalizations. We wish to know in detail how such things can
be explained apart from intention and design. If a plant depends on
stick-tights for dissemination of its seed, its success in the struggle
for life presupposes real double-pointed tacks from the outset. But
this way lies complete surrender. We must haul down the biological
flag. Back to Paley and the only authentic palaeontology (or of
course one should say anatomy). We will even solicit a humble
place at the next Lord Mayor's dinner in order to make public
recantation of our heresy regarding the human epiglottis ; although,
we confess, the teleological account of that particular organ did use
to stick in our throats. "Consider how many Lord Mayor's ban-
quets have occurred during the last hundred years." (Is that how the
passage runs?) "What deglutition! What manducation ! And
not one Alderman choked in a century!"
All must have been planned in advance! That is one feeling
which the whole output of evolutionary writing, supported by no end
of more or less good-humored raillery, will not always quite dispel.
But there are other moods, equally recurrent, when the outrageous
corollaries of our erstwhile cheap anthropomorphism bring us to
confusion. Miami, then, has been undergoing punishment lately.
And the Black Plague was a benign heavenly visitation. And the
Great War was a far-off divine event. And this is the best of all
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possible worlds. And "spite of pride, in erring reason's spite, one
thing is clear: whatever is. is right." Surely Alec Pope had his
tongue in his cheek when he wrote those lines ; or else he richly de-
serves to have told about him the story of what recently happened in
my library. Our unlettered domestic, cleaning the bookshelves, was
observed to take down a copy of the "Essay on Man" and look at
the title. "Hm", she remarked, "Pop's Easy Man", and non-
chalantly replacing the volume went on with her dusting. Beyond
doubt Juanita was right. If Berkeley justly complained of the way
in which people sometimes sit down in a forlorn skepticism, we may
be pardoned for suggesting that it is quite as reprehensible to sit down
in an abandonment of optimism. The case is by no means as simple
as the easy Essay represented it to be.
What is to be done in this predicament? Numerous avenues of
escape have been suggested, but frankly the aim of this paper is to
comment on the misleading character of some of these. To begin
with, there is Samuel Butler, who first attracted our attention as
capable of saying something worth while, by that memorable, if
somewhat cynical, remark in the "Way of All Flesh" about political
and religious fundamentalism. He characterized certain people as
desiring higher prices and cheaper wages ; but otherwise, he said,
they were most contented when things were changing least. "Toler-
ators. if not lovers, of all that was familiar, haters of all that was
unfamiliar, they would have been equally horrified at hearing the
Christian religion doubted and at seeing it practised." We presently
discovered that althoug-h Butler, as hinted by this passage, was
himself an ardent believer in change, that is in evolution, he was
a most acute critic of the more doubtful aspects of Darwinism; and
so far our sympathies were with him. But whether anything can
be made of his doctrine of unconscious purposiveness is another
question. The doctrine seems plausible at first, possibly because
coupled with such a successful attack on the natural selection
theor)^ Butler indeed plays havoc with Darwin's fortuitous varia-
tions
;
yet he seems not to have perceived that the argument against
Darwin is capable of being turned back against his own view. If
the variations are fortuitous and minute, where, truly, is natural
selection to obtain a foothold ? But if the variations are unconscious-
ly purposive, as Butler maintained, what is to keep them in line
long enough for significant modifications to be eiTected? We should
note that Butler believed as strongly as Darwin in the gradual
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accumulation of slight variations. For example there is his illustra-
tion of the web-footed bird.
"Thus," he says, "a bird whose toes were not webbed, but which
had under force of circumstances little by little in the course of
many generations learned to swim, .... such a bird did not probably
conceive the idea of swimming on water and set itself to get webbed
feet. The bird found itself in some small difficulty, out of which it
either saw, or at any rate found that it could extricate itself by
striking out vigorously with its feet and extending its toes as far
as ever it could ; it thus began to learn the art of swimming and con-
ceived the idea of swimming synchronously, or nearly so ; or per-
haps wishing to get over a yard or two of deep water, and trying
to do so without being at the trouble of rising to fly, it would splash
and struggle its way over the water, and thus practically swim,
though without much perception of what it had been doing. Finding
that no harm had come to it, the bird would do the same again and
again ; it would thus presently lose fear, and would be able to act
more calmly ; then it would begin to find out that it could swim a
little, and if its food lay much in the water so that it would be of
great advantage to it to be able to alight and rest without being forced
to return to land, it would begin to make a practice of swimming.
It would now discover that it could swim the more easily according
as its feet presented a more extended surface to the water ; it would
therefore keep its toes extended whenever it swam, and as far as
in it lay. v/ould make the most of whatever skin was already at the
base of its toes. After very many generations it would become web-
footed, if doing as above described should have been found con-
tinuously convenient, so that the bird should have continuously used
the skin about its toes as much as possil^le in this direction."
Now this is all very fine until we come to the proznso in the last
sentence. After very many generations the bird would become web-
footed /'/ doincj as above described sJwiild Jiave been found con-
tinuously convenient, so that the bird should have continuously used
the skin about its toes as much as possible in this direction/' This in-
dispensable condition, which Butler slips in without attracting much
attention to it. we have the right and the obligation to italicize. What
assurance is there that countless generations of land birds would
have continuously desired to find food or anything else in the water?
One exception, we must remember, would have disproved this rule.
One timid reactionary, like a fussy hen that would any time grate-
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fully starve to death in preference to g-etting her feet wet, would
have dcduckcd the earth's surface in advance and forever.
We must not lose ourselves in details, but a further argument of
Butler's touching the question calls for notice. Explaining the very
gradual manner in which, according to his theory, purpose becomes
defined and realized, he says: "It may appear as though I were
blowing hot and cold with the same breath, inasmuch as I am in-
sisting that important modifications of structure have been always
purposive ; and at the same time am denying that the creature modi-
fied has had any purpose in the greater part of all those actions
which at length have modified both structure and instinct
[But] provided there is a very little perception of and prescience
concerning the means whereby the next desired end may be attained,
it matters not how little in advance that end may be of present de-
sires and faculties ; it is still reached through purpose, and must be
called purposive If each one of the small steps is purposive
the result is purposive, though there was never purpose extended
over more than one, two. or perhaps at most three, steps at a time."
Now it is the fashion to berate formal logic for never discovering
any fallacies except such as have been made to order and put in text
books to be rediscovered there by a notably illogical and reluctant
younger generation. But how is the foregoing argument of Butler's
for a beautiful instance of a fallacy in real life? "If each of the
small steps is purposive, the result is purposive." Surely purposive
is used in two senses here, and the statement is just as misleading
as any stock example of composition in the logic manuals ; as can be
shown by substituting for purposive the really appropriate expression
in each case. The sentence will then read : "If each of the small
steps is intentional, the result may be spoken of as intentional, al-
though as a matter of fact none but the last participant in the series
actually intended it." Or more briefly: "If each of the small steps
is (consciously) purposive, the result is (unconsciously) purposive,
—whatever that may mean. But this is poles asunder from the
original proposition.
We are thus brought face to face with the major problem, which
may now be considered without any further reference to stick-
tights, water-fowl, poultry-yards, or even material fallacies in logic.
Is, or is it not, the expression unconscious purposiveness a contra-
diction in terms ? Is, or is not, entelechy an idol of the market-place,
a cant word in philosophy, which we are in some danger of rolling
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off our tong^ues with too pious unction? Is, or is not, teleology a
term that we should be more careful about employing, unless we de-
liberately use it in the good old-fashioned connotation which meant
something, or, in the current idiom, had teeth in it, by which to get
hold of human comprehension? Professor Creighton once wrote:
"At the present time one may perhaps say that the fundamental
question in philosophy is whether it is possible to employ the cate-
gory of Teleology or Purposiveness as an explanation of the uni-
verse and of our own experience; and, if so, what content is to be
given to this conception." After commenting on the inadequacy of
causo-mechanical interpretations, he significantly continued :—"The
question then is: Are we justified in advancing to a different form of
judgment, to judgments of Teleology or Individuality? If this
question be answered in the affirmative, it is above all essential to
remember that a change of category is no excuse for indefiniteness.
Philosophical analysis and interpretation are necessarily different
from those of science, but philosophical procedure must not be less
strict than that of the sciences, or its conceptions less carefully de-
fined." The passage just quoted ran without change through the
last two editions of the Logic, published in 1913 and 1920. James
Ward's "Realm of Ends" had been published in 1911 ; Bosanquet's
"Principle of Individuality and Value" in 1912 (the Lectures were
in 1911). Hobhouse's "'Development and Purpose" appeared in
1913. It might therefore seem as if, in spite of his obvious leanings
toward a teleological view, and notwithstanding the noteworthy
contributions of Ward, Bosanquet, and Hobhouse in the same direc-
tion. Professor Creighton thought, near the very end of his life
and work, that the problem of purposiveness was still greatly in
need of clarification. With this opinion, if he did hold it, I at least
should concur. That is, the post-Kantian antinomy is yet unresolved.
To restate the situation, there is on the one side mechanism,
which is no longer satisfactory to anybody, chiefly perhaps for the
reason that, as Hobhouse has suggested, the most teleological thing
imaginable is a machine, and the more perfect, the more teleological
;
on the other side there is radical finalism. also an outworn doctrine,
largely because it appears to be inconsistent with our moral ex-
perience ; and between these extremes we find a limbo of rather ill-
defined conceptions ranging, say. from Butler's view already men-
tioned, to Lloyd Morgan's "Emergent Evolution" and General
Smuts's "Holism" recently announced. Now Lloyd Morgan and
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General Smuts and those who anticipated them (for it is doubtful
whether there is much that is new in principle in these lately pub-
lished volumes) may be on the rio^ht track ; but that is not to assert
that the question of purposiveness is greatly illuminated by the fa-
vorite doctrine of these recent writers, namely that a true whole is
more than an agg^regate and cannot be understood by reference
merely to the nature of the units combined in the whole ; that
the whole determines the parts instead of being determined by them.
Surely this is the essential principle of an entelechy. and no one
could wMsh to dissent from it. So far, so good. But we are still in
the dark as to how we can apprehend a final cause that does not
precede its eft'ect by way of being a plan or idea present either
to the consciousness of an organism itself or to the mind of some
external agent. Old-fashioned teleology with a vengeance! But
should we not perhaps cease calling our theories teleological, unless
we are willing to entertain this view ?
Purpose, that is, involves awareness of an end. Purposiveness is
the most characteristic mark of intelligence. To think at all is to
intend. To know is to appreciate the meanings of things, to relate
them from the point of view of their significance. To be conscious
is to have desires and aims. All this we believe to be good doctrine.
We are roused to commendable fervor by the typical utterances
of idealism, for example that fine remark of Bosanquet's that "if
anything bewilders us in the proceedings of nature, we set it down,
as a mere matter of course, to our ignorance." We flatter ourselves
that we discover a teleological trend even in T. H. Huxley, as for
instance when he says that the amount of order discoverable in the
universe is limited only by our ability to perceive it ; or again, sur-
prisingly enough, in the Romanes Lecture, where commenting like
any dyed-in-the-wool evolutionist on the impermanence of the
cosmos, he says: [The world thus] "assumes the aspect not so much
of a permanent entity as of a changeful process in which naught
endures save the flow of energy and the rational order which per-
vades it." And Huxley called himself an agnostic. Agnostic noth-
ing! we retort. What more does idealism crave than rational order?
For how could rational order be brought to pass by anything else
than mind? Or. in Bosanquet's words, how could anything be due
to mind that never was a plan before a mind? "It couldn't," a cer-
tain still small voice within us keeps declaring. But evolution, if con-
sistent, asserts flatly that it could, and must. Very well, then, let the
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two Opponents have it out tog^ether. But we are not sure that peo-
ple who are supposed to be fighting for teleology will not look like
deserters if they go very far toward compromise with a relentlessly
non-teleological foe.
Passages of doubtful complexion occur in books as admirable a"
those of Hobhouse. For instance there is a page in "Development
and Purpose" where the attempt to deduce teleological behavior
from sensori-motor responses ends in "iust words", or as perhaps
one would better say, in the restoration of purposiveness under an-
other name to the position from which it was supposed to have been
banished. "Katuram cxpcllas fnrca, tanicn usque recnrrct." "Drive
out purpose with a fork, Still she'll come and ask for work!" Thus,
in the present context, we may translate the familiar line.
Hobhouse's paragraph is as follows:
"Without the formation of purpose it is possible that actions
should be coordinated in series, so as to produce results of im-
portance to the organism. This brings us to the second method in
which sensori-motor response may serve the future. Just as the
hereditary structure may determine a reflex response, which per-
forms a function without intelligence or purpose, so it may de-
termine a tension of feeling guiding a train of sensori-motor acts
—
and indeed of structural and reflex acts along with them— and per-
sisting till a result of importance to the organism is attained. Trains
of action so determined are generically instincts. We may conceive
that where there is a well-developed instinct, but little or no in-
telligence, the train of action is determined by a tension, which at
any given point is satisfied only by a performance which falls in with
the course leading up to the final accomplishment of the result, and
by no other. The solitary wasp dragging a spider to its hole does
not act altogether mechanically, nor altogether intelligently. But it
is not satisfied till it gets the spider into the hole. That result, and
no other, relieves the tension. Where intelligence arises within the
sphere of instinct, it probably takes short views at the outset and
aims at near results, which will relieve the tension and so satisfy.
From these it advances step by step till it grasps the end of the in-
stinct, which then becomes suffused with purpose."
Having quoted this passage I will dismiss it, believing its un-
satisfactory character to be apparent. It is no explanation of a
developing instinct to say that hereditary structure determines it
;
nor yet of a train of acts to say that it is governed by a "tension".
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"Hereditary structure" and "tension" as here employed are plain
idola fori; and besides that, the paragraph is full of teleological con-
cepts in spite of the non-purposive presuppositions with which it
begins.
There is one more passage in Hobhouse to which I may call
attention as further revealing the difficulties that lie in wait for
believers in teleology wdio assent too readily and completely to some
of the conclusions of modern science. In the second chapter of
"Development and Purpose" Hobhouse falls in line with those vol-
untarists, from Schopenhauer down, who have desired to extend the
concept of mind so as to make it include much more than what is
clearly conscious. "The facts of consciousness", Hobhouse says,
"reveal upon examination the working of causes strictly continuous
with those that appear within the field of consciousness itself, but
yet extending outside that field. There appears in short to be some-
thing that operates unconsciously, but yet in a manner closely com-
parable and even in essence identical with many of the operations
familiar to us as operations of consciousness. Moreover by these
operations, proceeding as it were in the background, the attitude
of consciousness is in a large measure determined. Conscious and
unconscious operations then may be legitimately grouped together,
and without prejudgment as to their ultimate nature the sum of
them may be called Mind. Mind then appears as that which has
consciousness in its foreground, while in the background it is the
theatre of energies, of interactions, of stresses and strains, the
play of which goes to determine the character of the scene by which
the said foreground is filled. To understand this relation, not in its
metaphysical essence, but in its empirical detail, is highly important
for our purpose."
Now I would say at present that the empirical detail is all right.
At least it would appear that we must concede this point, however
reluctantly, because the empirical description seems to be valid ; and,
besides, there is the testimony of Freud, Jung, and the rest ; even
of \\'illiam James, who solemnly declared (and he was not often
solemn) that the most important psychological discovery an a
quarter century was the subconscious life of human beings. But the
'metaphysical essence' is cause for genuine alarm. What follows
from the remark that by operations proceeding in the background the
attitude of consciousness is in large measure determined? The ques-
tion answers itself ; for how can anvone retain a shadow of con-
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fidence in purpose as a metaphysical principle, after yielding pre-
dominance in the mental-spiritual-conscious realm to mere physical
and unconscious factors ?
But someone will now say,—"What has become of the post-
Kantian antinomy? One side was to be as g^ood as the other in this
debate, and here you are talking idealism and not giving the adver-
sary half a chance. Why not spell 'adversary' with a capital A in
the time-honored manner of religion, since by appealing to prejudice
and misinformation you are making a veritable devil out of mechan-
ism, though if opportunity were afforded mechanism could pre-
sent a very gfood case." The fact is. I admit the justice of these
strictures. Idealism does .appeal to me. I was brought up that
way ; and then, to use William James's expression, it is a more illus-
trious theory. But mechanism, also, I often admire, particularly at
those times, inevitable in everyone's life, when the evidence seems
conclusive that the "universe has no sort of relation to moral ends".
What I dislike, and this is the substance of the present discussion, is
the spectacle of idealism making unsolicited and unnecessary over-
tures to its opponents, by trying to turn consciousness into the uncon-
scious and purposiveness into the non-purposive. Such adventures
seem to be neither promising nor legitimate. Furthermore (though
this, again, is abandoning a strictly impartial, antinomian stand-
point) it would be more appropriate for the overtures to come from
the other side.
